USMCA review looms large amid trade tensions and a push for diversification
Trade talks between Canada and the US are expected to be conditioned by on-and-off cycles of escalation and détente in the run up to the USMCA review talks in July 2026. The agreement has been instrumental for keeping Canada one of the less tariffed jurisdictions, since compliant exports (85% of total) are exempted from most of the Trump administration’s tariff regime (including the country-specific IEEPA tariffs and certain sector tariffs such as section 232 on vehicles and auto parts) at the time of writing. However, this can change as the US puts further pressure in the run-up to July 2026, especially if Canada sticks to a hardball approach. Our working assumption is that the agreement will survive, though it is harder to say if in the form of a full extension (from 2036 to 2042) or subject to another revision in 2027. The US is likely to demand increased market access for dairy, poultry and eggs and stricter US / regional content requirements, which will be hard to sell domestically.
In parallel, Canada will pursue efforts to rebalance foreign trade in the direction of greater geographical diversification. Closer ties to Europe will be the most straightforward to implement, by fully exploiting the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement. The relationship with China, however, is at a crossroads. On one side, Chinese demand for LNG will be key for diversifying energy trade. However, the US will likely expect Canada to replicate its protectionist stand vis-à-vis China. It would not be the first time that Canada is caught in the crossfire between China and the US. Canada’s mirroring of the Biden administration’s 2024 tariffs on EVs led China to retaliate with tariffs on agricultural exports. Plus, Mexico’s wide-ranging tariffs on China introduced in September 2025 set a precedent. Otherwise, progress is being made in normalizing the relationship with India, which had notoriously deteriorated after the assassination of an exiled Sikh leader on Canadian soil in 2023.
PM Mark?Carney of the centreleft Liberal Party (170 /343 seats) heads a fragile minority government that relies on adhoc support from the regionalist Bloc Québécois (22) and the leftwing New?Democratic?Party (7). Minority governing arrangements are relatively common in Canada, and for the moment the public would likely punish any party that threatens continuity and stability. But with the next federal election in 2029, early elections are a risk worth monitoring.
Trade uncertainty continues to weigh on an underperforming economy
Thanks to the USMCA exemption, Canada’s observed tariff rate is the lowest among the US’s major trading partners (3%, vs 10% world average). However, specific, particularly targeted industries are suffering acute damage, such as autos, steel/aluminum and wood. More materially, the prospect of continued escalation in the trade war and a breakdown of USMCA is inciting a wait-and-see attitude among consumers and investors. Exports to the US represent 76% of the total, and 20% of GDP. Though the economy is narrowly avoiding technical recession, it is expected to perform below potential for a second consecutive year. Furthermore, the ongoing global oil glut should keep export prices contained. Regions are unevenly exposed to the trade war, with Ontario and Quebec suffering from their reliance on auto and metals, while regions specialized in extractive industries (Alberta, Saskatchewan) are better protected.
With the impact of the trade war targeted rather than widespread, spillovers to the services sector and the overall job market have been limited so far. Domestic tourism has benefited from Canadians cutting southbound travel by 30%. The contribution of domestic consumption should be positive but modest by historical standards, limited by weakening population growth. We estimate that unemployment has peaked and is expected to decline, while staying elevated by the standards of the recent decade, above 6%. Due to front-loaded spike in exports early in 2025, 2026 should be the first full year where exports are suppressed. Conversely, we do not assume additional significant retaliatory tariffs on the U.S. and thus see little room for imports to decrease further. Hence, we expect the contribution of net exports to remain negative. Momentum in residential investment is projected to build in 2026, supported by government housing measures programs (expanded public housing, zoning and permitting deregulation) and declining borrowing costs. The noticeable boost to public infrastructure investment will provide a rich project portfolio (LNG pipelines, Quebec port expansion, Darlington nuclear plant) that will support non-residential investment. Inflation should remain close to 2%, with a minor uptick in the second quarter of 2026 as the temporary effect of eliminating the federal fuel charge diminishes. The central bank is expected to hold rates broadly constant at a slightly accommodative-to-neutral stance.
Twin deficits: the price of the trade war
The fiscal framework for 2026 and onwards is heavily shaped by the need to diversify the country’s growth model away from US exports. Capital spending is expected to ramp up to 1.4% of GDP in 2026, and 1.6-1.7% in 2027-2030; up from an average 1% in the 2020-2025 period. These initiatives mainly aim to strengthen the defense and industrial base, building housing/ hospitals / transport infrastructure, and tax incentives for private CAPEX (expensing, R&D subsidies). To offset part of this push, budget aims to severely cut operational spending, mostly focused on reducing the civil service from a recent peak of 368,000 in 2024 to 330,000 by 2029. Departments (excluding defense, police and border security) are targeted for 7.5% cuts in 2026–27, escalating to 10% in 2027–28, and reaching 15% in 2028–29. However, this should only amount to savings worth 1.8% of 2025 GDP over 5 years, compared to 5% of GDP in additional expenditures, broadly doubling the size of budget deficits over the near term compared to the previous policy configuration. The risks from this leveraging are substantially mitigated by liquid asset holdings.
The trade war, the increased demand for investment and depressed commodity prices are putting downward pressure on the current account balance, which should worsen slightly. Goods exports are not expected to recover meaningfully until late 2026 , and infrastructure and defense spending will create meaningful import needs in machinery & equipment. The services deficit, however, is expected to improve and move closer to balance, on account of an improved net tourism balance. Gross external debt is rather high (145% of GDP), but the net international investment position is firmly in surplus at 61% of GDP.

アメリカ合衆国
欧州
中華人民共和国
日本
英国(グレートブリテン及び北アイルランド連合王国)
メキシコ合衆国








